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Abstract
Population aging challenges the financing of social security systems in developed
economies, as the fraction of the population in working age declines. The resulting
pressure on capital-labor ratios translates into a pressure on factor prices and pro-
duction. While European countries all face this challenge, the speed at which their
population ages differs, and thus the pressure on capital-labor ratios. If capital
markets are integrated, differences in population aging may lead to cross-country
spillovers, as investors freely seek the best returns on capital. Using a multi-country
overlapping-generations model covering 14 European Union countries, I quantify
spillovers and find that capital market integration leads to redistribution across
countries over the long run. For instance, GDP per capita would on average be
2.9 %-points lower in Germany in each of the next 50 years if capital markets were
perfectly integrated and public debts kept constants with increases in labor income
taxes, compared to a closed economy case; by contrast, GDP per capita would on
average be 2.1 %-points higher in France, whose population ages slower than in
Germany. I also show that pension reforms can change the cross-country redistri-
bution patterns, some countries losing from capital market integration without the
reform but winning with it.
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1 Introduction
Differences in population aging speed lead to differences in capital-labor ratios and
returns to capital, ceteris paribus. Integration of capital markets can thus lead to slow
changes in the distribution of capital across countries over time. Using a multi-country
overlapping-generations model calibrated for 14 European countries, the main goal of
this paper is to quantify cross-country spillovers due to population aging and capital
market integration. The influence of social security reforms is also investigated.
The old-age dependency ratio is projected to increase from 35% to 60% over the next
five decades in Germany, but only from 30% to 47% in France. Everything else equal,
population aging should thus increase the capital-labor ratio and depress returns to
capital more in Germany than in France. With integrated capital markets, capital should
gradually flow from Germany to France, a basic theoretical prediction (Adema et al.,
2009). There is empirical support for some of these theoretical predictions, countries with
lower dependency ratios having a smaller net foreign asset position (Higgins, 1998; Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti, 2002). Assuming integrated capital markets, quantitative simulation
studies in general equilibrium find international spillovers across world regions which
differ in demographic and institutional characteristics (e.g. Boersch-Supan et al., 2006).
Whether differences in population aging are sufficient to generate spillovers between
countries with similar institutional setups is however unknown.
The paper also uses general equilibrium quantitative simulations to answer this ques-
tion. Compared to the existing literature, there are two main differences. First, I
consider differences between countries, not only between regions of the world. Exist-
ing general equilibrium analyses with endogenous labor supply consider several world
regions, all having different economic institutions (including Fehr et al., 2005; Boersch-
Supan et al., 2006; Attanasio et al., 2007; Krueger and Ludwig, 2007; and Vogel et al.,
2017)1. Using a multi-country model calibrated for Europe allows to detect spillovers
even if institutional setups are similar. The analysis also provides a practical contribu-
tion to the policy debate, policy coordination discussions usually taking place between
countries and seldom between regions. Second, I pay particular attention to the role of
capital in production, given the focus on capital market integration. Consistent with
empirical evidence (Duffy et al., 2004), I assume capital-skill complementarity, the fact
that capital is more complementary to high-skilled than low-skilled labor2. In related
research ignoring population aging (Davoine and Molnar, 2017), we found that capital-
skill complementarity indeed increases the magnitude of output spillovers, as variations
in capital in the integrated capital market impact the domestic contribution of the most
productive type of labor3.
1Some of these models also have one country among several regions. There exist also some general
equilibrium quantitative evaluations with multi-country models and endogenous labor supply, as opposed
to multi-regions models, but they do not assess the impact of capital market integration (Catalano and
Pezzolla, 2016). Other models with exogenous labor supply exist, but only consider variations of the
the numerator of the capital-labor supply ratio.
2Capital-skill complementarity also helps to account for wage inequality variations over time (Krusell
et al., 2000). The approach here has similarities with Jin (2012): allowing usage of capital in production
to differ across countries, she provides a theory which can help to rationalize the direction of international
capital flows.
3A third difference with the existing literature is the focus on redistribution between countries (or
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Concretely, the first goal of the paper is to quantify cross-country spillovers due
to population aging and capital market integration within the European Union, taking
into account major demographic and economic variations in the rest of the world. The
second goal is to assess the influence of social security reforms on the spillovers. Policy
implications are then derived from these assessments.
To achieve these goals, I use a multi-country overlapping-generations model devel-
oped in related research (Davoine and Molnar, 2017). The basis is an Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987) model with endogenous labor supply decisions, three exogenous skill
classes, capital-skill complementarity and detailed social security features. As in Buiter
(1981) and Boersch-Supan et al. (2006), labor is assumed to be immobile but capital mo-
bile in perfectly integrated capital markets, which leads to international spillovers. The
model is calibrated for a representative sample of 14 European Union countries and two
stylized Rest-of-the-world regions, one representing developed countries and the other
developing countries.
Simulations show that differences in population aging and capital market integration
lead to visible cross-country spillovers, even when institutional settings are comparable.
For instance, GDP per capita is projected to be an average of 2.9 %-points lower in
each of the next fifty years in Germany when capital markets are integrated and labor
taxes increased to keep public debt constant, compared to a closed economy case with
separated capital markets. On the other hand, GDP per capita would on average be
2.1 %-points higher in France under integrated capital markets. The reason are aging
differences: as the population is projected to age faster in Germany, labor supply will
be reduced faster, the capital-labor ratio increased more and thus the returns to capital
depressed further; investors will gradually shift their asset holdings away from Germany
and towards France, which sustains production there.
I also find that cross-country redistribution patterns depend on social security re-
forms. For instance, GDP per capita is projected to be 1.9 %-points lower in Denmark
with capital market integration when public debts are kept constant by increases in
labor income taxes, but 0.8 %-points higher when public debts are kept constant by
an increase of the retirement age and a (smaller) increase in labor income taxes (in
all countries). In other words, Denmark would be a long-term loser of capital market
integration if the unique reform was on the labor tax code, but a winner if retirement
age was also increased. The main reason is the current size of the Danish welfare state,
which requires a high level of taxation. In the first case, the disincentive effect of higher
taxes is strong and dominates other effects. In the second case, the tax increase is milder
and the disincentive effect too, so that the slow population aging effect dominates.
As a related result relying on the same mechanisms, I find that capital market inte-
gration changes the ranking of pension reform options in some countries. For instance,
simulations show that labor tax increases are preferable to a 20% cut in pension benefits
regions) in overall macroeconomic terms. Fehr et al. (2005), Attanasio et al. (2007) and Krueger and
Ludwig (2007) also provide information on redistribution, but this information is either not part of
the discussion (first two studies) or the discussion is restricted to the impacts on capital markets (last
study). By contrast, I consider the overall macroeconomic impact, summarized by the usual GDP per
capita indicator.
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in Belgium with no integration, but the opposite with full capital market integration:
instead of cutting pensions, implementing tax increases leads to an average 0.7 %-points
gain in GDP per capita in each of the next 50 years without integration, but a yearly
0.4% loss with integration.
These results have implications for the policy debate, particularly in Europe. Al-
though the creation of the Euro has sped up the integration of capital markets (Lane,
2006), these markets remain partially national. The subprime and sovereign debt crisis
in Europe have led to reforms of the economic governance of the European Union and
multiple proposals for additional policy reforms. Taking stock of the policy debate, the
European Commission makes two concrete policy recommendations and suggests fur-
ther evaluation of a number of reform proposals (European Commission, 2017). One of
these recommendations is the implementation of a Capital Market Union, which should
support the integration of capital markets and thus help to absorb country-specific ex-
ogenous shocks. This paper and its long-run focus provide a complement to existing
analyses, which highlight the important short-run stabilization properties of such a Cap-
ital Market Union.
The paper continues as follows. The next section presents the model. Section 3 de-
scribes the experiments and provides their results. Section 4 derives policy implications
while section 5 concludes.
2 Model
To quantify the cross-country spillovers of population aging and associated social security
reforms, I use the multi-country overlapping-generations model presented in Davoine
and Molnar (2017). The model links countries through an integrated capital market.
Consistent with the literature, only capital is freely mobile, while labor is either immobile
or flows across countries in an exogenous fashion.
Concretely, the starting point is an existing single-country overlapping-generations
model routinely used for policy evaluation, extended into a multi-country model following
the Buiter (1981) procedure4. The single-country model is of the Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987) type. As unemployment varies across countries, the single-country model starts
from Jaag et al. (2010), an overlapping-generations model with imperfect labor markets.
Because the skill distribution also differs across countries, this basis is extended to
include three skill classes with exogenous education decisions, following Jaag (2009).
The resulting model is similar to the one in Berger et al. (2016).
I start the description with the single-country model basis, continue with the multi-
country extension and finish with calibration5.
4The extension has been used in a number of studies, including Frenkel and Razin (1986) and
Boersch-Supan et al. (2006).
5The presentation follows Davoine and Molnar (2017). The technical appendix of Berger et al. (2016)
contains further technical details on the single-country basis.
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2.1 Single-country setting
Demographics: Households go through several stages a ∈ {1, . . . , 8} in their lives.
A stage a lasts several time periods. After birth, households educate, then enter the
labor market and retire. Several stages a cover labor market activity, reflecting different
productivity levels (typically hump-shaped). Households face a constant, age-dependent
probability of dying 1 − γa. They differ in skills, birth date and death date6. After
they are born, they are randomly assigned one of three skill levels, low, medium or high,
i ∈ {l,m, h}. Medium and high skills are acquired through further education, which has
no monetary cost but delays access to the labor market. Education for medium skills
takes place in stage a = 1, for high skills in stages a ∈ {1, 2}. Retirement is defined
exogenously and happens some time during stage aR = 5. Stages a ∈ {6, 7, 8} are full
retirement stages but with different probabilities of dying 1 − γa, to better replicate
the empirical age structure of the population. As in Blanchard (1985), a reverse life
insurance allocates assets at death7.
Labor market: After education, households can enter the labor market. They choose
whether to participate or not (at a rate δa,i ∈ [0, 1], which represents the number of
time periods of the life-cycle stage with participation). The labor market is imperfect,
leading to unemployment. Households who join the labor market start unemployed.
Further, households who have a job may be hit by idiosyncratic unemployment shocks
with probability 1 − εa,i in each time period. Depending on search efforts, a job may
or may not be found. If unemployed, households choose job search efforts (sa,i ≥ 0).
If they have a job, they decide how many hours to work (la,i ≥ 0). Being spared the
unemployment shock leads to rents, which are bargained with firms to define the wage,
building on the static search and matching setting of Boone and Bovenberg (2002). As
in Jaag et al. (2010), non-participation in life-cycle aR is interpreted as retirement. The
sequence of households decisions related to the labor market is summarized in figure 1.
Conditional on labor market participation and employment, gross labor income
equals
ya,ilab = l
a,i · θa,i · wi,
where θa,i is an exogenous age-productivity profile calibrated with micro-data and wi is
the bargained wage per efficiency unit, assuming separate labor markets for each skill
class.
Household maximization: Households make labor decisions
(
δa,i, sa,i, la,i
)
and con-
sumption decisions Ca,i to maximize their expected life-time utility V 0,it , where V
a,i
t is
the expected remaining life-time utility of a household in life-cycle stage a with skill
6In the implementation, households also differ in the the speed at which they go through the stages
of the life cycle, which reflects differences in appetite for effort, luck or other unobserved attributes,
a generalization of Gertler (1999) used in Jaag et al. (2010). For ease of presentation, we ignore this
model feature. The complexity arises in numerical simulations. Aggregation results, presented in the
on-line appendix of Berger et al. (2016), help to deal with it.
7We use an implementation where the average durations of stay in each life-cycle stage correspond to
ages 15-19, 20-24, 25-39, 40-54, 55-69, 70-79, 80-84 and 85+. We later use the words “ life-cycle stage”
and “age group” interchangeably.
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Figure 1: Sequence of households decisions related to the labor market
level i at time t. Preferences are expressed in recursive fashion and restrict households
to being risk neutral with respect to variations in income but allow for an arbitrary
intertemporal elasticity of substitution:
V a,it = max
[(
Qa,it
)ρ
+ γaβ
(
GV a,it+1
)ρ]1/ρ
,
where ρ defines the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1/(1 − ρ), β is a time dis-
counting factor, Qa,it is effort-adjusted consumption, G = 1 + g is the gross factor of
growth by which the model is detrended.
Labor market activity generates disutility. Effort-adjusted consumption Qa,i cap-
tures the utility cost of labor market activity expressed in goods equivalent terms, with
Qa,i = Ca,i − ϕ¯a,i (δa,i, sa,i, la,i) ,
and ϕ¯a,i a convex increasing function in all its arguments8. Specifically,
ϕ¯a,i = δa,i
[(
1− ua,i)ϕL,i (la,i)+ (1− εa,i)ϕS,i (sa,i)] +
ϕP,i
(
δa,i
) − (1− δa,i + δa,iua,i)ha,i,
where ua,i ∈ [0, 1] represents the fraction of time in unemployment, ha,i is the value of
home production if the household is not working, ϕL,i captures the disutility of working,
ϕP,i the disutility of participation and ϕS,i the disutility of job search efforts.
Given the Blanchard (1985) insurance, the budget constraint of households is:
Gγa,iAa,it+1 = Rt+1
(
Aa,it + y
a,i
t − Ca,it
)
,
where Aa,i represent assets, ya,i net income flows and R = 1 + r the gross interest rate.
8This approach for modelling the preference structure is taken from Greenwood et al. (1988) and is
applied, among others, in Jaag et al. (2010).
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Social security: Before retirement, non-participants receive (net) welfare benefits
yanonpar while unemployed workers receive (gross) unemployment benefits ba,i = bi · ya,ilab,
where bi is the skill-dependent replacement rate. After retirement, households re-
ceive (net) pension benefits ya,ipens = νaP a,i + P a0 , where P a0 is a flat part, P a,i rep-
resents acquired pension rights and νa is a conversion factor between pension rights and
pension payments. Pension rights accumulate with labor earnings, following P a,it+1 =
δa,it
(
1− ua,it
)
ya,ilab,t + P
a,i
t .
Taking labor income taxes and social security contributions τa,it into account and
assuming that each labor market state (i.e. non-participation, unemployment and em-
ployment) is visited in each time period9, net household income amounts to:
ya,i =

(
1− τa,i) δa,i [(1− ua,i) ya,ilab + ua,iba,i]+ (1− δa,i) yanonpar if a < aR,(
1− τa,i) δa,i [(1− ua,i) ya,ilab + ua,iba,i]+ (1− δa,i) ya,ipens if a = aR,
ya,ipens if a > aR.
Production: Production is made by a competitive representative firm taking input
prices as given, namely wage rates, the interest rate and the price of the output good,
which serves as numeraire. Changes in the production process are costly variations in
the capital stock, and are subject to convex capital adjustment costs, following Hayashi
(1982).
The production function is linear homogenous:
Yt = F
Y
(
Kt, L
D,i=1
t , L
D,i=2
t , L
D,i=3
t
)
.
The labor inputs LD,it from different skill classes are not perfect substitutes. We as-
sume capital-skill complementarity, a feature which can account for wage inequality vari-
ations (Krusell et al., 2000) and which is consistent with empirical evidence (Griliches,
1969).
Firms make investment It and hiring decisions to maximize the flow of dividends they
can generate. Formally, the firm maximizes its end of period value W , which equals the
stream of discounted dividend payments χ:
Wt = W (Kt) = max
It,L
D,i
t
[
χt +
GW (Kt+1)
Rt+1
]
,
s.t. χt = Yt − It − J (It,Kt)−
∑
i
(1 + τF,a)witL
D,i
t ,
GKt+1 =
(
1− δK)Kt + It,
where J (·) denotes the adjustment costs and τF,a the firms social security contribution
rate. Labor demands are pinned down by the marginal products and the labor costs,
which consist of wage and contribution rates, i.e. YLD,i = (1+τF,a)wi. Given an interest
9The assumption follows Jaag et al. (2010). Alternatively, one can assume income pooling (perfect
insurance) within each age and skill class, as used for instance by Andolfatto (1996) in his real business
cycle and unemployment theory.
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rate, investment is defined so that the return on financial investments (the interest rate)
equals the marginal cost of investment (Tobin’s q), which depends on the marginal
product of capital, net of capital adjustment costs and depreciation10.
Government: Government provides welfare benefits, unemployment insurance, pay-
as-you-go pensions and investment subsidies. State expenditures also include public
consumption, long-term care and health expenditures, all defined exogenously in per
capita terms and generating no utility.
To finance expenditures, the government collects consumption taxes, labor and cap-
ital income taxes, profit taxes, firm and worker social security contributions. The gov-
ernment can borrow on the capital market (with or without premium on the interest
rate) to finance public debt, to meet some exogenously defined target (most of the time
kept constant in simulations).
Single-country equilibrium: In a single-country setting, we assume that the gross
interest rate Rt+1 = 1+rt+1 is exogenously defined, as for small open economies. Savings
can be invested in firms, government debt and foreign assets. Assuming no arbitrage,
the net returns on these three types of assets are the same and equal to the interest rate
rt+1. The goods market then clears because of trade with the rest of the world:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + TBt,
where Ct is the aggregate private consumption11, Gt is government expenditure and
TBt is the trade balance. Holding of foreign assets by domestic households evolves with
changes in the trade balance:
DFt+1 = Rt+1
(
DFt + TBt
)
.
Private household assets At are invested in the domestic representative firm Wt,
government debt DGt and foreign assets DFt , so that the asset market clearing condition
is satisfied:
At = Wt +D
G
t +D
F
t .
2.2 Extension to a multi-country setting
We follow Boersch-Supan et al. (2006), an extension of the two-country Buiter (1981)
procedure to any number of countries and capital adjustment costs. The main assump-
tion is that labor is immobile but capital is perfectly mobile. This assumption can be
relaxed by allowing mobility of labor with exogenously defined international flows, as
will be done in the quantitative analysis. One also assumes that all countries produce the
10In steady-state, the capital stock is stable so that there are no capital adjustment costs. In this
case, investment satisfies the standard condition where the interest rate equals the marginal product of
capital net of depreciation, r = FYK − δK .
11So, Ct =
∑
i
∑
aN
a,i
t C
a,i
t where N
a,i
t is the number of households alive at time t, member of age
group a and skill group i. Other households-related aggregate variables are defined in a similar fashion,
including aggregate financial assets At.
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same composite good and that they either belong to the same currency union, or that
exchange rates are constant. The interest rate is no longer exogenous, but endogenous.
Equilibrium: Under these assumptions, the equilibrium interest rate is the same in
all countries. The intuition is as follows. Assume there is an arbitrage opportunity.
Investors in the low interest rate country start to invest in the high interest rate country.
The capital stock in the first country declines, increasing the marginal product of capital
and thus the interest rate in that country. The opposite happens in the second country.
This continues until an equilibrium is reached where the two interest rates are identical.
As a whole, the set of countries is a closed economy, where the interest rate adjusts
so that the goods market clear. The resulting equilibrium interest rate is thus the unique
value such that the goods market clear over all countries. Formally, considerM countries
indexed by j ∈ {1, ...,M}. Assume that terms of change are fixed and that each variables
are normalized so that the numeraire value, after currency-exchange corrections, is the
same in all countries. The interest rate is then the unique value such that∑
j∈{1,...,M}
TBj,t = 0.
Rest of the world: We do not consider all countries in the world but restrict policy
analysis to a smaller subset12, too small to be isolated from the world capital markets.
Consistent with empirical evidence, the goods market, as a whole, will not clear over this
subset. We thus consider a large synthetic Rest-of-the-world country (or a small group
of Rest-of-the-world countries), which will account for trade with the rest of the world.
The goods market will clear over all countries which are either part of the subset, or
one of the Rest-of-the-world countries. Compared to a case without a Rest-of-the-world
country, the adjustment of the equilibrium interest rate is dampened. This reflects access
of all countries to the world capital market.
2.3 Calibration
The basis for the multi-country model is a single country model calibrated for 14 Euro-
pean countries used for policy evaluation. The calibration of the multi-country model
is thus inherited from the single country models, with the exception of the Rest-of-the-
world country. I first summarize the calibration part which is inherited, then continue
with aging-related processes and finish with the calibration of the Rest-of-the-world
country.
12In the implementation, the subset contains 14 countries member of the European Union, namely
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic*, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands,
Poland*, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden* and the UK*. In this list, stars identify the four countries whose
currency is neither the Euro nor pegged to the Euro, and thus do not meet our assumption of fixed
exchange rates. We keep these countries in the list to have broader diversity and because exchange rate
variations vanish over the long run. In reality, exchange rate variations absorb some of the country-
specific shocks over the short run, reducing the size of cross-country spillovers for these four countries,
ceteris paribus.
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Calibration of the single country basis: Where available, we take consensual em-
pirical estimates from the literature. Production function specifications are adopted from
Jaag (2009). Labor supply elasticities are derived from Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner, and
Saez (2007) and productivity profiles from Mincer wage regressions on EU-SILC micro-
data. Average participation rates, unemployment rates and working hours per age and
skill classes are computed from LFS and EU-SILC datasets. Parameters for institutions
are derived using the European Commission MISSOC database and OECD’s Tax-Benefit
model. Intervivo transfer parameters are calculated to generate life-cycle consumption
profiles in line with empirical evidence.
Calibration of aging-related processes: I choose fertility and mortality rates for
the 14 European countries in the model to match the demographic projections from
Eurostat (2015), which are used in the Ageing Working Group (2015). Fertility and
mortality rates for the two Rest-of-the-world countries are chosen to match the projec-
tions from the United Nations (2015).
A number of European countries have scheduled pension reforms, in order to deal
with the future financing challenges created by an aging population. Typically, the
statutory retirement age is scheduled to be increased and pension benefits reduced13.
In order to quantify cross-country spillovers due to population aging alone and isolate
them from policy reforms influences, pension parameters will be kept unchanged in
some scenarios. By contrast, scheduled pension reforms, as consolidated by the Ageing
Working Group (2015), will be used in other scenarios involving policy reforms.
Public health- and long-term care are also expected to change over time. There
is a large debate over cost drivers and how they will change in the future. Unlike
pension expenditures however, there are cost drivers which are neither demographic nor
economic, such as technological progress. In its reference scenario, the Ageing Working
Group (2015) assumes that age-dependent per capita costs will be declining. Because
social security policy has little (direct) influence on technological improvements, I follow
these projections and apply a gradual age-dependent per capita reduction of health- and
long-term care costs14.
Calibration of the rest of the world: To be able to reflect large economic differences
between countries to some extent without including many single countries, we model
and calibrate a North rest-of-the-world country (NROW) and a South rest-of-the-world
country (SROW). While we do not analyze impacts outside the EU, we capture the
impact of forces coming from outside of the EU, in line with our objective. We choose
to aggregate Canada, Japan and the USA to form the stylized NROW country while we
choose Brazil, China and India to form the SROW country15.
13Social security contributions rates are seldom scheduled to change, if at all (Ageing Working Group,
2015).
14Because the project focuses on demographic and economic components and not on health technology
components, which may differ across countries, I apply the same reduction to all countries, taking the
projections for Germany from the Ageing Working Group (2015).
15With these choices we are capturing close to 60% of the actual real world GDP and five of the eleven
most important trade partners of the EU, together reflecting more than 40% of total trade of the EU.
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The calibration process rests on macro- and micro-level data, either as direct inputs
or as calibration targets. Macro-level data is in general available for all six countries
forming the NROW and SROW, in data sources which include the ILO, the OECD, the
UNESCO and the World Bank.
Micro-level data on the other hand is not available for all of the six countries. For the
sake of consistency, we ignore micro-level data specific to Rest-of-the-world countries.
We follow instead a three step approach. First, for each of the six Rest-of-the-world
countries, we identify a twin country (or a set of countries) from our sample of 14
calibrated countries whose demographic, economic and policy characteristics are the
closest. Second, we use the micro-level data inputs for this twin country in the calibration
process of the NROW and SROW. Third, we make stylized corrections to the resulting
calibration outcome where there are documented differences.
This approach results in using micro-level calibration inputs from the UK for Canada,
Japan and the USA and an average of calibration inputs from the Czech Republic, Slo-
vakia and Poland for Brazil, China and India. The most important stylized corrections
are proportional adjustments to the participation and unemployment rates by age and
skill classes to match the aggregate participation and unemployment rates16.
3 Quantitative results
This section presents the experiments performed to quantify cross-country spillovers
with aging populations and associated reforms required to ensure the financing of welfare
states. The approach is presented first and results for each experiment next.
For ease of reading, results and discussion will be focused on four countries illustrat-
ing the range of possible outcomes, namely Belgium, Denmark, France and Germany.
Results for the other countries in the sample, provided in appendices, are similar and so
are their explanations. I report and discuss evolutions between 2015 and 2065, to allow
for comparisons with the benchmark results of the Ageing Working Group (2015)17.
3.1 Approach
I use the multi-country overlapping-generations model presented in section 2 to perform
simulations. Under population aging, I consider several scenarios which ensure the
financial sustainability of the welfare state over the long run and compare two cases.
In the first case, capital markets are perfectly integrated. In the second case, capital
markets are not integrated. Instead of assuming small open economies, I assume in
the second case that trade with foreign countries remains constant in per capita terms,
which corresponds to isolated closed economies18 ,19. I avoid the small open economy
16For details on the calibration of the Rest-of-the-world countries, see Davoine and Molnar (2017).
17For technical reasons, simulations are made over 200 rather than 50 years, to allow for a stationary
steady state at the end of the period. Results over the first 50 years are not influenced.
18In the second case, a standard single-country model can be used. The same model is used for
simulations in the two cases however, either in its multi-country version (with integrated capital markets)
or in its single-country version (without capital market integration).
19I choose to keep constant trade per capita rather than no trade at all, as in strictly closed economies,
because I want economies to be the same at the start in the two cases, to be able to compare outcomes.
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Figure 2: Aging and labor tax reforms, GDP per capita variations, 2015-2065
assumption because it leads to a bias (see Davoine, 2017). The comparison of outcomes
in the two cases will allow to identify benefits (or losses) from capital market integration
under an aging population.
I consider three types of simulations. In the first, countries perform no social security
reforms. In the second kind, countries increase the retirement age. In the last kind,
countries change pension benefits. Details of the scenarios will be presented below. The
only constant element in all scenarios is the use of labor income taxes to keep public
debt constant: if a particular reform is insufficient to avoid an increase in debt, taxes
are increased on top of it20.
3.2 Results with no social security reforms
Population aging creates a financing challenge for welfare states, as the proportion of
households in working age is reduced: without any reforms, social security revenue
declines while expenditures for public pay-as-you-go pensions, healthcare and long-term
care increase, threatening the financial sustainability of welfare systems (Ageing Working
Group, 2015). In the first scenario presented here, we assume that no social security
reforms take place, so that labor income taxes need to be increased to finance the social
security system. Specifically, taxes are adjusted so that public debt remains constant.
Figure 2 and table 1 provide the results for the two cases, in a multi-country environ-
ment where capital markets are integrated and in a single-country closed environment
where capital markets are separated for each country21.
The key finding is as follows:
20If a reform would bring so much gains that debt would decrease, then taxes are lowered to keep
public debt constant.
21In all figures and tables, GDP per capita figures represent deviations from the long run growth
trend.
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Belgium Denmark France Germany
2015 2065 2015 2065 2015 2065 2015 2065
CE MC CE MC CE MC CE MC
Dependency ratio 0.29 0.41 0.41 0.29 0.42 0.42 0.30 0.47 0.47 0.35 0.60 0.60
Retirement age 59.6 59.6 59.6 62.7 62.7 62.7 60.2 60.2 60.2 60.6 60.6 60.6
Pension benefits* 0.0 -1.1 -3.6 0.0 0.6 -1.8 0.0 -1.5 0.1 0.0 11.8 8.0
Labor tax 0.15 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.52 0.51 0.10 0.28 0.28 0.09 0.29 0.30
Labor/capita* 0 -10 -10 0 -14 -14 0 -13 -12 0 -16 -18
Interest rate* -53 -40 -36 -22 -39 -36 0 -26 -36 -10 -59 -36
Capital/capita** 0.0 2.6 -2.0 0.0 4.8 -1.2 0.0 -2.0 2.1 0.0 10.4 2.0
GDP/capita** 0.0 -3.6 -4.9 0.0 -4.1 -6.1 0.0 -4.9 -2.8 0.0 -1.2 -4.1
GDP/capita gap*** -1.3 -1.9 2.1 -2.9
Legend: * = variation in 2065, compared to 2015 (in %); ** = average variation over years 2015 to 2065, compared
to 2015 (in %); *** = average percentage points variation over years 2015 to 2065, compared to 2015; Pension
benefits = average pension expenditure per retiree; Labor tax = average labor income tax for employed workers;
Labor/capita = effective worked hours per capita; GDP/ capita gap = difference between CE and MC cases; CE =
single-country with closed economy; MC = multi-country with perfect capital market integration.
Table 1: Aging and labor tax reforms, 2015-2065
Finding 1. Capital market integration with an aging population and variations in labor
income taxes to keep public debt constant lead to international spillovers and redistri-
bution across countries over the long run: some countries benefit from capital market
integration (up to 2.1 %-points higher GDP per capita on average in each of the next 50
years, compared to a closed economy) while others lose (up to 4.8 %-points lower GDP
per capita).
For instance, table 1 shows that the GDP per capita should drop 4.9% in yearly
average between 2015 and 2065 in France when capital markets are not integrated (cor-
responding to a closed economy case) but only 2.8% when capital markets are integrated
(in a multi-country setting). In yearly average thus, the GDP per capita is 2.1 %-points
higher with capital market integration. By contrast, all other countries reported in the
table lose from capital market integration, average GDP per capita being 1.3 %-points
lower in Belgium, 1.9 %-points lower in Denmark and 2.9 %-points lower in Germany.
In our sample, the biggest gain is in France and the largest loss in the Netherlands (at
4.8 %-points, see appendix A).
The main explanation is differentials in demographic dynamics. The old-age de-
pendency ratio in Germany is projected to increase from 0.35 to 0.60 over the next 50
years for instance, but only from 0.30 to 0.47 in France over the same time span. The
rapid decline in labor supply in Germany increases the capital-labor ratio fast, and thus
depresses returns on capital investment faster than in France (and other countries). In
an integrated capital market, investors thus modify their portfolio over time, shifting
investments from Germany to France (until the unique international interest rate is
equalized). The capital stock thus drops in Germany and increases in France, relative
to a closed economy case. GDP per capita variations follow. Figure 5 in appendix B
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illustrates the explanation chain with the transition path of key variables.
This explanation applies to France, Germany and most of the countries in our sample.
There are however a few exceptions, namely Belgium, Denmark and Italy. The first two
are aging slowly so should benefit from capital market integration, yet lose. The opposite
applies to Italy. Another factor also plays a role in all three cases, namely taxation and
its associated Laffer curve effect. I take the example of Denmark to illustrate.
Denmark ages slowly, its dependency ratio being projected to increase from 0.29 to
0.42 over the next five decades. One would expect Denmark to benefit from capital
market integration, as France. However, its initial level of taxation is so high that
the necessary increase in taxes to finance increasing social security expenditures has a
strong negative impact on labor supply incentives (Laffer curve effect). To finance its
large welfare state indeed, Denmark needs to set labor income taxes and social security
contributions at a cumulated effective rate of 40% for employed workers (while the second
highest rate is 30% in our sample and the average is 25%). The effect is strong enough
to dominate the benefits from a slowly aging population, relative to other countries.
Taking all margins into account (demographics, working hours,...), the net labor supply
drops more in Denmark than the average in other countries. As for Germany then, the
capital-labor ratio increases faster, returns to investment decline more and thus capital
moves overtime from Denmark to other countries, which are aging slowly and have a
milder exposure to Laffer curve effects.
The following remark will play a role in the discussion of policy coordination. In this
scenario and for our sample, there are winners and there are losers, but the weighted
average GDP per capita gains and losses is close to zero: five countries benefit from
capital market integration (for an average GDP per capita gain of 1.2 %-points) and
nine countries lose from it (for an average loss of 1.8 %-points; see appendix A). Capital
market integration is, in this sense, a zero sum game.
3.3 Results with retirement age reforms
Increasing the statutory retirement age is one way to ensure the financial sustainability
of the social security system with an aging population, as revenue from social security
contributions increase and pension expenditures decline.
Two scenarios are considered. In the first one, only one country increases the retire-
ment age. In the second scenario, all countries implement the reform.
3.3.1 Retirement age reform in one country
The main purpose of this scenario, where only one country implements a retirement age
reform, is an illustration of the key mechanisms at play. It will also help to articulate
policy implications.
Simulations in section 3.2 showed that cross-country spillovers take place because
countries age at a different speed, because tax burdens differ and because capital markets
are integrated. In particular, investors change their portfolio composition over time
to seek the highest returns, generally where the capital-labor ratio is increasing least.
Countries, in this sense, compete for capital. There may be thus incentives for strategic
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GDP/capita, 2015-2065 Belgium Denmark France Germany
In integrated capital markets . . .
. . . no retirement age increase** -4.87 -6.07 -2.77 -4.09
. . . retirement age increase in Germany** -4.88 -6.10 -2.78 1.24
. . . reform impact*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 5.33
Under closed economy ...
. . . no retirement age increase** -3.61 -4.14 -4.87 -1.16
. . . retirement age increase in Germany** - - - 4.00
. . . reform impact*** - - - 5.17
Benefits of integrated capital markets . . .
. . . retirement age increase in Germany*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.16
Legend: ** = yearly average variation over years 2015 to 2065, compared to 2015 (in %); ***
= average percentage points variation over years 2015 to 2065, compared to 2015; see text for
additional details.
Table 2: Aging, retirement age and labor tax reforms, Germany only, 2015-2065
behavior. In order to depress their capital-labor ratio and attract capital, countries
may try to be the only (or the first) country to increase their statutory retirement age.
Since Germany has the biggest economic size and is one of the countries which suffers
most from capital market integration, I select it as the country which seeks strategic
advantage, for illustrative purposes. As always, labor income taxes are changed in all
countries so that public debts remain constant.
Results are provided in table 2, showing average macroeconomic impacts, measured
by yearly average GDP per capita variations over the next five decades in Belgium,
Denmark, France and Germany, in four different cases. Two cases have been previously
presented, where no country increases retirement age either with integrated capital mar-
kets or in closed economies (from section 3.2). Two additional cases appear where
Germany is the only country gradually increasing its retirement age by 2.5 years, once
with integrated capital markets and once in a closed economy22. The table also displays
the impact of the German reform with integrated markets and closed economies, and
concludes with the benefit which can be derived from capital markets integration when
Germany increases its retirement age.
What the simulations show can be summarized in the following way:
Finding 2. A retirement age increase in an aging population delivers higher gains in
an integrated capital market than in autarky when the country is the only one to perform
the reform (3%), gains which are offset by losses over the entire set of countries (the
GDP/capita would be on average 0.16 %-points higher in each of the next 50 years in
Germany if the country is alone to gradually increase its retirement age 2.5 years under
integrated capital markets, compared to autarky, equal to 3% of the 5.17 %-points gain in
autarky; the GDP/capita in other countries would decrease on average 0.01 %-points).
22Results are provided in the last case (increase in retirement age and closed economies) only for
Germany, because other countries are not impacted by a German reform when economies are separated.
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Under integrated capital markets and with a retirement age reform, the GDP/capita
in Germany is 1.24% higher each of the next 50 years on average, but drops on average
4.09% without the reform. The average reform gain is thus 5.33 %-points. In a closed
economy setting, the respective numbers are 4.00%, -1.16% and 5.17 %-points. A per-
fectly integrated capital market thus increases the gains from the retirement age reform
by 0.16 %-points.
The intuition for this result is the following. When Germany increases its retirement
age, its capital-labor ratio drops, which increases returns to investments. When capital
markets are integrated, foreign investors notice and rebalance their portfolio to increase
their investments in Germany. In a closed economy, foreign investors leave their portfo-
lios untouched. Over the long run thus, the capital stock and production are increasing
more with a postponed retirement age and integrated capital markets in Germany. This
portfolio rebalancing with integrated markets also explains why investments, capital
stocks and production decline in other countries.
Note that the magnitude of the gain for Germany is small compared to the loss
due to capital market integration with an aging population: 0.2 %-points instead of
about 3.0 %-points (see section 3.2). The main reason is that aging differentials lead to
larger relative variations in labor supply and thus the capital-labor ratio, compared to
variations generated by the retirement age reform.
3.3.2 Retirement age reforms in all countries
I investigate the impact of the same retirement age reform in all countries (except the two
Rest-of-the-world countries, which use labor income taxes to finance increasing social
security expenditures). Specifically, the retirement age is gradually (linearly) increased
by a total of 2.5 years over the next 50 years, the 2.5 years mark corresponding to the
average scheduled retirement age increase in the countries from our sample (as per the
Ageing Working Group, 2015). This increase may or may not be sufficient to finance
all of the increase in social security expenditures. If it is not, labor income taxes are
increased so that public debt remains constant.
Figure 3 and table 3 provide the results. The figure reproduces the results from
the scenario where aging is financed with labor income taxes only (from section 3.2),
which is used as benchmark. Again results are provided for two cases, in a multi-country
environment where capital markets are integrated and in a single-country closed economy
where capital markets are separated by country.
There are two key findings. The first one is similar to finding 1 in section 3.2. It
does not provide new insights but is included for the sake of completeness:
Finding 3. Capital market integration with an aging population, a gradual increase of
the retirement age of 2.5 years in all European countries and variations in labor income
taxes to keep public debt constant lead to international spillovers and redistribution across
countries over the long run: some countries benefit from capital market integration (up
to 3.1 %-points higher GDP per capita on average for each of the next 50 years, compared
to a closed economy) while others lose (up to 3.8%-points lower GDP per capita).
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Figure 3: Aging and labor tax reforms without and with retirement age increase, GDP
per capita variations, 2015-2065
Belgium Denmark France Germany
2015 2065 2015 2065 2015 2065 2015 2065
CE MC CE MC CE MC CE MC
Dependency ratio 0.29 0.41 0.41 0.29 0.42 0.42 0.30 0.47 0.47 0.35 0.60 0.60
Retirement age 59.6 62.1 62.1 62.7 65.0 65.0 60.2 62.7 62.7 60.6 63.1 63.1
Pension benefits* 0.0 -0.2 -0.5 0.0 2.5 1.2 0.0 5.3 7.4 0.0 21.4 17.5
Labor tax 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.30 0.44 0.42 0.10 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.22 0.22
Labor/capita* 0 -2 -1 0 -5 -4 0 -3 -3 0 -8 -9
Interest rate* -27 -45 -41 -14 -29 -41 0 -37 -41 -9 -84 -41
Capital/capita** 0.0 2.1 2.9 0.0 5.7 4.2 0.0 2.7 7.6 0.0 16.3 7.2
GDP/capita** 0.0 -1.2 0.5 0.0 -0.9 -0.2 0.0 0.2 2.9 0.0 4.0 1.1
GDP/capita gap*** 1.8 0.8 2.7 -2.9
Legend: see table 1
Table 3: Aging, retirement age and labor tax reforms, 2015-2065
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As shown in table 3 for instance, the GDP per capita should increase 0.2% on average
between 2015 and 2065 in France when capital markets are not integrated (corresponding
to a closed economy case) and 2.9% when capital markets are integrated (in a multi-
country setting). The GDP per capita is thus on average 2.7 %-points higher with
capital market integration. By contrast, average GDP per capita is 2.9 %-points lower
in Germany with integrated capital markets. Results for our entire sample show that the
biggest gain is 3.1 %-points in Italy and the biggest loss 3.8 %-points in the Netherlands
(see appendix A).
The explanation for this finding is similar to the explanation for finding 1, based
on demographics differentials: labor supply per capita drops faster in countries whose
population ages fast, increasing more the capital-labor ratio and thus depressing more
returns to investment, triggering a capital flight when markets are integrated, and thus
a loss in production capacity in those countries.
The next finding, best visible in figure 3, shows that redistribution patterns created
by capital market integration depend on the exact reforms which ensure the financial
sustainability of social security systems:
Finding 4. Losses from capital market integration with an aging population are over-
turned (into gains) for some (but not all) countries when all European countries increase
gradually the retirement age by 2.5 years, rather than relying solely on variations in la-
bor income taxes to keep public debt constant: while the average GDP per capita in
Austria, Belgium and Denmark is respectively 0.05, 1.3 and 1.9 %-points lower with
capital market integration and a constant retirement age than with separated markets,
it is respectively 1.3, 1.8 and 0.8 %-points higher with capital market integration and
increased retirement age than with separated markets (yearly averages over the next 50
years).
The explanation for this finding is similar for all three countries, with a twist for
Austria. I take the example of Denmark, continuing on the explanation for finding 1
in section 3.2: Denmark is aging slowly but has a high tax burden, so that the labor
supply disincentive effects (Laffer curve) of increased labor taxes dominate the gains
from a slowly aging population, relative to other countries. When the retirement age
is increased, taxes do not need to be increased so much, so the Laffer curve effects are
dampened and dominated by the gains from the slow aging process: relative to the
average European country, labor supply per capita does not drop as much, the capital-
labor ratio does not increase as much so the returns to investment increase over time in
Denmark; capital flows over time to Denmark, boosting production23.
I conclude this section with a remark. The increase in the retirement age reduces the
GDP loss per capita due to aging (and sometimes even transform the loss into gains),
as production factors are larger. The outcome, which holds with and without capital
23The twist for Austria is the following hypothesis. The aging process in Austria is not particularly
slow (but neither fast). Compared to other countries however, Austria makes a relatively strong use of
capital in production, which helps to keep returns to investment high there and thus attracts foreign
investments.
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Belgium Denmark France Germany
2015 2065 2015 2065 2015 2065 2015 2065
CE MC CE MC CE MC CE MC
Dependency ratio 0.29 0.41 0.41 0.29 0.42 0.42 0.30 0.47 0.47 0.35 0.60 0.60
Retirement age 59.6 59.6 59.6 62.7 62.7 62.7 60.2 60.2 60.2 60.6 60.6 60.6
Pension benefits* 0.0 -20.1 -21.3 0.0 -17.7 -19.6 0.0 -19.5 -18.1 0.0 -8.6 -11.7
Labor tax 0.16 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.48 0.47 0.10 0.22 0.22 0.09 0.25 0.26
Labor/capita* 0 -9 -9 0 -12 -12 0 -12 -11 0 -16 -17
Interest rate* -43 -32 -36 -21 -36 -36 0 -25 -36 -11 -58 -36
Capital/capita** 0.0 0.6 -1.7 0.0 4.9 -0.6 0.0 -1.9 2.3 0.0 10.2 2.1
GDP/capita** 0.0 -4.5 -4.5 0.0 -3.8 -5.5 0.0 -4.6 -2.5 0.0 -1.2 -4.1
GDP/capita gap*** 0.0 -1.7 2.1 -2.9
Legend: see table 1
Table 4: Aging, pension benefits and labor tax reforms, 2015-2065
market integration, is well known in the public finance literature (see for instance Jaag
et al., 2010).
3.4 Results with pension benefit reforms
The three standard parametric reforms of the pension systems are changes in the retire-
ment age, changes in pension benefits and changes in social security contribution rates.
Increases in the retirement age to maintain the financing of the social security system
with an aging population have been investigated in section 3.3. Here I investigate cuts
in pension benefits24.
I consider two scenarios, one where all countries perform the same reform and the
other where magnitudes of the reforms differ.
3.4.1 Pension benefit reforms of same magnitude
In this scenario, the benefit ratio is gradually decreased over the next 50 years in all
European countries of the sample, so that it is 19% lower in 50 years25. The figure
corresponds to the projected decrease in all countries of the sample, as per the Ageing
Working Group (2015). The cuts reduce the pension expenditures but may or may not
be sufficient to balance social security expenditures with revenues, as aging unfolds. If
they are not, labor income taxes are increased so that public debt remains constant.
Results are provided in figure 4 and table 4 for the two cases, multi-country with
capital market integration and single closed economy without integration. As before,
the figure reproduces the results from the benchmark scenario where aging is financed
with labor income taxes only.
24I do not investigate increases in social security contribution rates on their own, because outcomes
are in general similar to increases in labor income tax rates, investigated in section 3.2.
25Following the Ageing Working Group (2015), the benefit ratio is the average pension as a share of
the average wage. In the simulation, I change the pension replacement rate in the same proportion as
the benefit ratio is projected to change, ignoring general equilibrium effects (that is, assuming constant
average wages). To illustrate, a country where the benefit ratio is 0.500 today would reduce it to 0.405
in 50 years (a 19% drop).
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Figure 4: Aging and labor tax reforms without and with pension cuts, GDP per capita
variations, 2015-2065
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With one exception, outcomes are very similar to the scenario where the welfare
state is kept financially sustainable by increases in labor income taxes only, presented
in section 3.2. The same finding can be applied here. In the interest of space, I do not
repeat it.
The exception is as follows:
Finding 5. Pension cuts in all European countries do not change the redistribution
pattern created by capital market integration under an aging population where variations
in labor income taxes keep public debts constant (as outlined in finding 1), with one
exception: while Belgium loses from integration without pension cuts (yearly GDP/capita
on average 1.0 %-points lower over the next 50 years), the impact of integration is neutral
with pension cuts in all European countries (yearly GDP/capita on average neither lower
nor higher).
The finding, which is based on simulation results from tables 1 and 4, is explained as
follows. For all countries but Belgium, pension cuts decrease aggregate pension expen-
ditures and do not require as large an increase in labor income taxes, and thus do not
depress labor supply incentive as much. But this benefit takes place with and without
capital market integration. Demographic differentials thus continue to play a driving
role (see section 3.2).
In Belgium, the smaller increase in labor income taxes is sufficient to change the
balance of the two factors which dominate variations in effective labor supply. As seen
for Denmark in section 3.2, when pension benefits are maintained, the high initial tax
burden and large increase in labor taxes lead to strong Laffer curve effects with a large
negative impact on labor supply, increasing the capital-labor ratio more than in other
countries and thus lowering returns to investments, in spite of a slower aging of the
population. When pension benefits are cut, labor income taxes do not need to be raised
as much, which reduces the Laffer curve effect. In this case, the balance of the Laffer
curve effect and slow population aging is tilted, so that the capital-labor ratio and thus
returns to investment in Belgium change in the same proportion as the average of other
countries. Capital market integration then has a neutral impact.
3.4.2 Pension benefit reforms of different magnitudes
In this section, I compare the implementation of pension cuts that countries currently
plan (as per the Ageing Working Group, 2015), which differ in magnitudes, with im-
plementation of the same average pension cut (as in section 3.4.1). Over the sample of
countries considered in this paper, own reform plans range from a 2% cut of the pension
benefit ratio over the next 50 years (Belgium) to a 39% cut (Poland), the average being
a 19% cut.
Table 5 provides the results, providing outcomes for reforms of own magnitude, of the
same average magnitude, when capital markets are integrated and when they are not.
Unlike in other result tables, outcomes are provided for Poland but not for Denmark, to
better illustrate the variety of impacts.
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GDP/capita, 2015-2065 Belgium France Germany Poland
Integrated markets, pension cuts of . . .
. . . own magnitude -4.85 -2.44 -4.11 -8.28
. . . average magnitude -4.50 -2.53 -4.12 -8.64
Gaps own vs average -0.36 0.08 0.01 0.36
Separate markets, pension cuts of . . .
. . . own magnitude -3.71 -4.57 -1.23 -6.87
. . . average magnitude -4.45 -4.64 -1.24 -7.13
Gaps own vs average 0.74 0.07 0.01 0.26
Legend: the table shows average GDP/capita variations over years 2015 to 2065,
compared to 2015 (% or percentage points); the average magnitude is -19%; the own
magnitude in Belgium is -2%, in France -24%, in Germany -17%, in Poland -39%;
see text for additional details.
Table 5: Aging, pension benefits and labor tax reforms, different magnitudes, 2015-2065
As the table shows, outcomes differ when countries implement a reform of differ-
ent magnitude, which is not a surprise. This result holds whether capital markets are
integrated or not. The only exception is Germany, due to the fact that the scheduled
pension cuts in Germany (-17%) are very close to the average over the entire sample
(-19%). More interesting is the comparison of outcomes when capital markets are inte-
grated and when they are not, which can be summarized in the following fashion:
Finding 6. In a few countries (Belgium, the Czech Republic, Poland and Sweden),
capital market integration changes the gap between pension cuts of own magnitude and
pension cuts of the same average magnitude (to an extent comprised between 0.1 and
1.0 %-points of the yearly average GDP/capita variations over the next 50 years); in
one case (Belgium), capital market integration even changes which of the two reform
scenario is preferable (own cut by a yearly 0.7 %-points margin in separated markets,
average cut by a yearly 0.4 %-points margin in integrated markets).
Outcomes are most striking for Belgium. When capital markets are integrated, its
own pension cut of 2% would lead to a yearly average GDP/capita loss of 4.85% over the
next 50 years; if all countries implement the average cut of 19%, the yearly loss is 4.50%.
According to production criteria, Belgium would thus support a policy coordination
measure where all countries implement the same average cut of 19%, which would lead
to a yearly average GDP/capita gain of 0.4 %-points in the country. If capital markets
were isolated, its own pension cut would lead to a yearly average loss of 3.71%, while the
average cut would lead to a yearly average loss of 4.45%. Belgium would not support
the same policy coordination if capital markets are not integrated, to avoid a 0.7 %-
points yearly average loss of GDP/capita. The overall GDP/capita differential created
by capital market integration is a yearly average larger than 1.0 %-points over the next
50 years, a significant number.
The explanation for such an outcome has two steps. Notice beforehand that the
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own pension cut of -2% is very small, so that this scenario is close to no pension cut
at all, variations in labor income taxes alone ensuring the financial sustainability of
social security over the long run. To simplify the exposition, I thus compare a tax hike
scenario with the average pension cut scenario. First, tax hikes can be preferable to a
19% pension cut in a closed economy setting, where capital markets are separated. Each
of the two options has advantages and disadvantages. Tax hikes directly reduce labor
supply incentives. Pension benefit cuts reduce the value of accumulated pension rights
in pay-as-you-go pension systems with earnings-related components, so indirectly reduce
labor supply incentives. Which of the negative and positive effects dominate depends
on the specifics of the tax and pension systems. One remarkable feature in Belgium
is that the tax and social security contribution burden is distributed relatively evenly
over the life-cycle, retirees being exposed to an average cumulative rate which is 90% of
the average cumulative rate of working households. By comparison, the (unweighted)
average is 56% in the other countries of the simulation sample. Unlike in other countries,
financing with labor income taxes is preferable to financing with pension cuts.
The second step involves capital market integration. Another effect weighs on the
balance between tax hikes and pension cuts. The same mechanism operates as in section
3.4.1. Pension cuts move the country away from strong Laffer curve effects, reducing the
negative impact of aging on labor supply, pushing down the capital-labor ratio and thus
increasing returns to investments. With integrated capital markets, pension cuts lead
to capital inflows, sustaining domestic production. Simulations show that this effect is
sufficiently strong to change the balance between tax hikes and pension cuts in favor of
pension cuts.
The mechanism is the same in the other countries, but smaller in magnitude. In the
Czech Republic, Poland and Sweden, there are quantitative but no qualitative changes.
Note in particular that own pension cuts in Poland are larger than the average cut, so
the signs are reversed: unlike Belgium, own cuts are preferable to average cuts when
capital markets are integrated.
4 Policy implications
Before presenting the implications, it is useful to remember that there were restrictions
to the international mobility of capital only a few decades ago and that they have been
gradually removed, increasing the integration of capital markets. The creation of the
Euro has also led to a marked integration of these markets, ahead of the integration
of the product markets and far ahead of the integration of the labor markets (Lane,
2006). However, capital markets are not yet fully integrated (Morelli, 2010; Gropp and
Kashyap, 2010). Whether full integration takes place is also a matter of policy. There
are for instance calls for measures supporting greater integration, both on the policy
side (e.g. European Commission, 2017) and the academic side (e.g. Veron and Wolff,
2016).
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4.1 Coordination implications
First, capital market integration depends to some extent on policy arrangements, includ-
ing differences across countries. Investor protection for instance differs across countries.
Further integration of the markets thus depends on international coordination of pol-
icy reforms. Second, our simulations show that there are cross-country spillovers due
to differences in the speed of population aging and to country-specific tax and pension
policy. If countries want to tackle jointly the cross-country redistributive effects of aging
differentials and social security policy, international coordination is needed.
Implication: capital market integration leads to cross-country spillovers and creates
losers and winners over the long run, generating new country coalition patterns.
Section 3.2 leads to this implication. Redistribution generated by capital market
integration over the long run is sizable: for instance, when labor income taxes are used
to cover the social security costs of population aging, capital market integration leads
to yearly average gains in GDP per capita exceeding 2 %-points in some countries over
the next 50 years, and yearly losses larger than 4 %-points in other countries. From our
sample of 14 countries, five benefit from integration (Finland, France, Italy, Sweden and
the UK), one essentially is not impacted (Austria) and eight lose (Belgium, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Spain).
In most cases, the first group of countries ages slower and is thus exposed to a slower
increase of the capital-labor ratio, leading to higher relative returns to investments and
attracting capital from other countries.
The dividing line between countries which benefit or lose from capital market in-
tegration over the long run is not the same as the lines which separate countries on
other topics of economic policy. There are different views on social security conditions
attached to labor market integration, for instance. Typically, less developed countries
are not interested in setting the higher social security standards that more developed
countries expect. There are however both less and more developed countries which stand
to lose from further capital market integration. Capital market integration thus creates
different coalition patterns.
Implication: capital market integration strengthens the need for social security re-
forms due to population aging in some countries, and reduces it in other countries.
Simulations results summarized in section 3.2 lead to this policy implication. Pension
reforms are generally more visible to the voter than the use of the general government
budget to finance social security deficits, either through debt or tax increases. On many
counts however, the passive approach of relying on the general budget delivers worse
economic outcomes than active social security reforms. Section 3.2 presents one such
passive case, where labor income tax variations ensure the financing of increasing social
security expenditures when populations are aging. The key result is that outcomes are
even worse in some countries when capital markets are integrated, because they age
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faster, are submitted to a worse drop in labor supply, larger increase in the capital-labor
ratio, bigger drop in returns to investment, and thus capital outflows. For instance, GDP
per capita in the Netherlands is projected to be an average 4.8 %-points lower in each
of the next fifty years with full capital market integration (compared to no integration
at all). In that country, integration makes the need for social security reforms bigger.
On the other hand, capital market integration helps some countries. GDP per capita is
projected to be an average 2.1 %-points higher in France with capital market integration,
which thus reduces the need for social security reforms.
Implication: if countries hold coordination discussions on pensions, they should also
discuss capital market integration at the same time.
This implication follows from simulation results summarized in section 3.4.2. Cur-
rently, European Union countries have scheduled different adjustments of their pension
benefit schemes (see Ageing Working Group, 2015). Belgium, for instance, plans a small
decrease of 2% of its pension benefit replacement rate, while the average over the 14
countries of the simulation sample is a decrease of 19%. Assume EU countries hold dis-
cussions to harmonize the adjustment of pension reforms and consider an option where
all countries implement this average 19% cut. Then Belgium would lose a yearly aver-
age 0.7 %-points of GDP per capita over the following 50 years if capital markets were
not integrated, but gain an average 0.4 %-points if these markets were fully integrated.
The yearly average differential is 1 %-point over the next 50 years, a significant num-
ber. Whether capital markets are fully integrated or not would change the position of
a country like Belgium. Coordination discussions on pension reforms should thus be
held at the same time as discussions on the policy measures furthering the integration
of capital markets. In the case of pension benefit reforms, the stronger the measures to
further integrate capital markets, the larger the support from Belgium to strong cuts of
pension benefits26.
4.2 Social security implications
Every pension reform option comes with advantages and disadvantages. Pension cuts
for instance help to keep taxes low and thus labor supply and production high, but
increase the risk of old-age poverty. Increases in the retirement age have the most
favorable impact on production without detrimental distributional consequences but may
not conform with workers preferences. Tax and social security contributions increases
may be more in line with these preferences but have a negative impact on labor supply
incentives and thus production. These general statements hold whatever the organisation
of capital markets. The difference with capital market integration is that the way to rank
the different pension reforms options needs to be changed, when one uses impacts on
production as evaluation criteria. Governments may thus have to change their reform
26It is beyond the scope of this paper to make a comprehensive evaluation of pension reforms coordi-
nation options. Analyses of the impact for all countries of the European Union, for each reform type,
is left for future research.
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evaluations as capital markets become more and more integrated. The implications
discussed below provide guidance on evaluation revisions.
Implication: capital market integration makes increases of the retirement age a more
interesting reform option in all countries.
This implication is derived from simulation results presented in section 3.3.1. Cross-
country spillovers indeed generate rewards for countries increasing retirement age, as is
discussed next.
Implication: there are rewards for early implementers of retirement age increases, due
to capital market integration and cross-country spillovers.
The simulation results which lead to this implication are summarized in section 3.3.1.
The yearly rewards remain moderate, simulations finding an average yearly gain or loss
in GDP per capita of around 0.2 %-points over the next 50 years. Accumulated over
years or decades, these differences can however become notable. Increases in retirement
age before other countries mitigate the drop in labor supply per capita due to aging,
compared to other countries. This leads to a smaller relative increase in the capital-labor
ratio and larger relative increase in returns to investment, attracting capital from the
integrated market27.
Implication: capital market integration changes the ranking of pension reform op-
tions for some countries.
The simulation results behind this implication are summarized in section 3.4.2. For
instance, simulations show that labor tax increases are preferable to a 20% cut in pension
benefits in Belgium with no (low) integration28, but the opposite with full (strong)
capital market integration: instead of cutting pensions, implementing tax increases lead
to an average yearly 0.7 %-points gain in GDP per capita over the next 50 years without
integration, but a yearly 0.4% loss with integration. The key reason is that pension
cuts have one more benefit under capital market integration: the smaller Laffer curve
effect leads to smaller drops in labor supply and returns to investment, whose benefits
can only be reaped when foreign investors make use of the integrated capital markets to
invest more in Belgium.
Implication: for some countries, the implementation of social security reforms plays
a crucial role in maximizing the benefit the country can gain from capital market inte-
gration (or reducing the losses it generates).
While simulations in section 3.2 show that Belgium and Denmark lose from capital
27Symmetrical conclusions hold: there are penalties of the same order of magnitude for late imple-
menters of retirement age increases.
28More specifically, labor taxes increase alone are preferable to a combination of 20% cuts in pension
benefits and (milder) increase in labor taxes. See section 3 for details.
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market integration when there are no social security reforms, section 3.4.1 shows that
these two countries gain from integration when all countries increase retirement age and
section 3.2 shows that Belgium no longer loses from integration when pension benefits
are cut. Similar patterns hold for other, but not all countries. Some countries lose
from integration in any case, but less so when reforms are implemented. For all these
countries, the GDP per capita gains from implementing the reform is a yearly average of
1 %-point or more over each of the next 50 years. The implementation of social security
reforms - most of the time, an increase of the retirement age - thus plays a crucial role in
maximizing the benefit that some countries can gain from the capital market integration
(or reduce the losses it generates).
4.3 Other implications and remarks
The discussion of important assumptions and the focus of the research leads to final
implications and remarks.
Implication: pro-immigration policies are one way to mitigate the negative conse-
quences of capital market integration in fast aging countries (and increase the benefits
in slow aging countries).
An important assumption of the analysis presented in section 3 is that demographic
projections are neither influenced by capital market integration nor by economic policy
reforms. In reality, migration partially depends on differences in economic conditions
between the origin and the destination countries. In a fast aging country, wages should
increase faster, as the labor supply per capita drops faster and the capital-labor ratio
increases faster. Over time, fast aging countries may become a more interesting immi-
gration destination, which would slow down the aging of the population and the negative
impacts of capital market integration. Immigration should thus mitigate the negative
consequences of capital market integration in fast aging countries (resp. increase the
benefits for slow aging countries). Pro-immigration policies can support this mitigation
(resp. enhancement) effects.
Remark: so far, no efficiency gains from coordination have been identified (in produc-
tion per capita terms), but welfare gains have not (yet) been considered and efficiency
gains with other coordination experiments have not been ruled out.
When the gains are measured in efficiency terms (production per capita), experiments
carried out in section 3 have not identified any coordination gains. Some countries indeed
gain over the long run from capital market integration, other countries lose, but it is a
zero sum game: scaling by economic size, the weighted average yearly impact on GDP
per capita is close to zero29. However, it could be a positive sum game (coordination
29One can verify it for instance by a weighted average of values in each of the last columns of the
tables in appendix A. The sum might slightly differ from 0 due to precision. See also the end of section
3.2.
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gains) with other policy experiments. The research presented here has not ruled out
such a possibility.
The point of view of governments, which tend to focus on GDP as main indicator
for economic policy, has been taken in this project. The point of view of households,
who balance consumption gained through labor with leisure, was out of the scope of the
research. Welfare analyses could thus reveal that capital market integration, with or
without the social security reforms considered in section 3, deliver coordination gains,
measured in welfare terms. For instance, countries with a slowly aging population,
which benefit from cross-country redistribution via the integrated capital markets, could
increase the retirement age less than other countries, losing some of the capital and
production gains but winning with leisure. Welfare gains in all countries might thus be
possible. This investigation is left for future research.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper investigates international spillovers due to capital market integration when
population ages and the cross-country redistribution that it generates, using a multi-
country overlapping-generations model calibrated for 14 European Union countries. The
influence of social security reforms on redistribution is also considered.
The first key finding is that differences in population aging speed generate redistribu-
tion across countries. When no social security reforms take place and labor income taxes
are increased to ensure sustainable public finances, GDP per capita can be more than
4 %-points lower under perfect capital market integration in fast aging countries than
under completely separated capital markets, as yearly average over the next five decades.
In slow aging countries, GDP per capita can be more than 2 %-points higher. Labor
supply indeed drops more in fast aging countries, pushing up the capital-labor ratio
more, which depresses returns to investment more and generates capital flows towards
slow aging countries, supporting production there.
The second key finding is that tax and pension policy influence redistribution pat-
terns. Some countries lose from capital market integration when no social security reform
is implemented, but gain from it when the same reform is implemented in all countries.
Finally, capital market integration influences the relative performance of different
tax and social security reforms. In some countries, labor tax increases are preferable
to pension cuts under separated capital markets, while it is the opposite with fully
integrated capital markets.
An immediate policy implication is that capital market integration increases the need
for social security reforms in some countries, but eases it in other countries. Ceteris
paribus, capital markets integration makes increases in retirement age a more inter-
esting options for reforming social security. Further, fast aging countries can support
immigration to mitigate the negative redistributive effects of capital markets integration.
Finally, as capital markets are not yet completely integrated, countries which want to
tackle jointly the redistribution effects of population aging need to discuss social security
reforms and deeper capital market integration at the same time.
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The research can be continued in different directions. I mention some of the most
interesting options. First, welfare analyses can be performed. In this paper, the point
of view of governments was taken, which tend to focus on production and public finance
outcomes. Although the analyses did not rule out potential efficiency gains from coordi-
nation, it did not find any. One could take the point of view of households, looking for
potential welfare gains from coordination. Second, an endogenous migration component
can be added. In this paper, international migration is taken as given, from demographic
projections. In reality, capital-labor ratios and thus wages will be increasing more in fast
aging countries. Migration towards fast aging countries should thus increase, reducing
the magnitude of cross-country redistribution.
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A Appendix: overview of results for all countries
This appendix provides an overview of the results for all countries for the main scenarios,
focusing on the main macroeconomic indicator (average GDP/capita variations over the
next 50 years). The legend of the tables follows that of table 1.
Dependency ratio GDP/capita change (%)
2015 2065 Average 2015-2065
CE MC Gap
MC-CE
Austria 0.28 0.50 -8.1 -8.1 0.0
Belgium 0.29 0.41 -3.6 -4.9 -1.3
Czech Republic 0.27 0.51 -6.0 -7.6 -1.6
Denmark 0.29 0.42 -4.1 -6.1 -1.9
Finland 0.31 0.45 -3.4 -2.6 0.8
France 0.30 0.47 -4.9 -2.8 2.1
Germany 0.35 0.60 -1.2 -4.1 -2.9
Italy 0.34 0.54 -5.9 -4.6 1.3
Netherlands 0.28 0.48 -3.1 -7.9 -4.8
Poland 0.24 0.58 -7.4 -9.0 -1.6
Slovakia 0.22 0.53 -7.8 -8.8 -1.1
Spain 0.29 0.63 -4.2 -5.2 -1.0
Sweden 0.31 0.42 -4.5 -4.3 0.3
United Kingdom 0.28 0.44 -7.1 -5.7 1.4
Table 6: Aging and labor tax reforms, all countries, 2015-2065
Dependency ratio GDP/capita change (%)
2015 2065 Average 2015-2065
CE MC Gap
MC-CE
Austria 0.28 0.50 -3.9 -2.6 1.3
Belgium 0.29 0.41 -1.2 0.5 1.8
Czech Republic 0.27 0.51 -2.5 -3.1 -0.6
Denmark 0.29 0.42 -0.9 -0.2 0.8
Finland 0.31 0.45 1.0 1.7 0.7
France 0.30 0.47 0.2 2.9 2.7
Germany 0.35 0.60 4.0 1.1 -2.9
Italy 0.34 0.54 -1.6 1.5 3.1
Netherlands 0.28 0.48 1.1 -2.7 -3.8
Poland 0.24 0.58 -2.0 -3.7 -1.6
Slovakia 0.22 0.53 -3.6 -4.6 -1.0
Spain 0.29 0.63 1.5 0.6 -0.9
Sweden 0.31 0.42 0.2 1.5 1.3
United Kingdom 0.28 0.44 -3.1 -2.0 1.1
Table 7: Aging, retirement age and labor tax reforms, all countries, 2015-2065
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Dependency ratio GDP/capita change (%)
2015 2065 Average 2015-2065
CE MC Gap
MC-CE
Austria 0.28 0.50 -7.9 -7.8 0.1
Belgium 0.29 0.41 -4.5 -4.5 0.0
Czech Republic 0.27 0.51 -5.8 -6.8 -1.0
Denmark 0.29 0.42 -3.8 -5.5 -1.7
Finland 0.31 0.45 -3.4 -2.7 0.7
France 0.30 0.47 -4.6 -2.5 2.1
Germany 0.35 0.60 -1.2 -4.1 -2.9
Italy 0.34 0.54 -5.7 -4.4 1.3
Netherlands 0.28 0.48 -2.9 -7.7 -4.8
Poland 0.24 0.58 -7.1 -8.6 -1.5
Slovakia 0.22 0.53 -7.7 -8.8 -1.1
Spain 0.29 0.63 -4.2 -5.3 -1.0
Sweden 0.31 0.42 -4.8 -4.1 0.7
United Kingdom 0.28 0.44 -6.9 -5.6 1.3
Table 8: Aging, pension benefits and labor tax reforms, all countries, 2015-2065
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B Appendix: transition path aging and tax scenario
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Figure 5: Aging and labor tax reforms, key economic variations, 2015-2065
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